Relatório do Secretário-Geral da ONU, Ban Ki-Moon - Excertos

"In order to achieve the priority objectives of restoring constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau and implementing critical reforms in the defence, security and justice sectors, Guinea-Bissau’s international partners have considered a number of options.

28. The first option involves mediation among national stakeholders aimed at facilitating a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the crisis. As mentioned earlier,
ECOWAS has already taken several important steps to commence this mediation process, including the appointment of the President of Guinea, Alpha Condé as Mediator for Guinea-Bissau. In addition, as mentioned in paragraph 24 above, at their Summit on 26 April, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government also called on all stakeholders to submit to ECOWAS mediation efforts with a view to agreeing on the modalities for a consensual transition through the holding of elections within 12 months.

29. The second option being considered is the imposition of targeted sanctions on the perpetrators and supporters of the military coup. ECOWAS, the African Union and CPLP have already announced their intention to impose targeted sanctions on the coup leaders and their political and military supporters, including travel bans, the freezing of assets and other measures, while the European Union is considering similar actions. The Security Council may also wish to consider this option.

30. A third option is the possible deployment of training and protection units, as envisaged under the ECOWAS/CPLP road map, to assist with the implementation of the security sector reform programme and contribute towards the protection of State institutions. In this regard, I have taken note of the decision taken by the ECOWAS
Heads of State and Government, at their extraordinary summit on Guinea-Bissau on 26 April, to deploy a standby force to Guinea-Bissau to, inter alia, facilitate the withdrawal of MISSANG, assist in securing the transitional process, and undertake preparatory work for the immediate implementation of the security sector reform road map. I have also noted the agreement of the military junta to the deployment of such a force.

31. A final option that has been requested by the Prime Minister, Carlos Gomes Júnior, in his letter to me of 9 April and, reiterated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Guinea-Bissau, Mamadú Saliu Djaló Pires, in his statement to the Security Council on 19 April, is the deployment of a peacekeeping or stabilization force. This option was also considered by the CPLP Council of Ministers at its extraordinary meeting on 14 April on the situation in Guinea-Bissau. Such a force could

(a) maintain peace and security;
(b) ensure constitutional order;
(c) protect national institutions, legitimate authorities and the population;
(d) ensure the completion of the electoral process; and
(e) assist in implementing security sector reform. This option would need to be thoroughly assessed and carefully considered in the event that all previously considered options do not succeed in achieving the objective of returning the country to constitutional rule."